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THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ INTRODUCTION: Appreciating Bill Stuntz
In the fall of 2009, we started planning a conference at Harvard Law School to celebrate the life and scholarly achievements of Bill Stuntz. Had it been up to Bill, this celebration never would have happened. "I feel uncomfortable about this," he emailed one of us. "It all seems to me undeserved -I'm not at that level -and I would think no one would be interested in writing for or publishing it."
Although characteristically modest, Bill was obviously wrong about his stature within the legal academy, where he is widely esteemed as the preeminent criminal procedure scholar of his generation. "Of course I'll be there," one leading scholar replied to our invitation. Every other invitee likewise accepted-quickly and enthusiastically, even when attendance required rearranging prior commitments.
Bill had another concern about the conference-one that the three of us shared. When conference planning began, Bill was already well into his second year of a Stage 4 cancer diagnosis; the prognosis was bleak. Neither he nor we wanted a funereal conference, with dark suits, long faces, and mournful tributes. Yes, we wanted space for fond recollections from mentors, colleagues, students, and friends, 1 but the heart of the conference that we envisioned would consist of scholarly explorations of Bill's work, its influence, and its relevance to modern criminal justice. We asked leaders in the field to contribute written essays, and the work they submitted turned out to be even more remarkable than we had imagined. We present these essays here as our collective tribute to our extraordinary colleague and friend, the late Bill Stuntz.
***** Stuntz began his teaching career at the University of Virginia School of Law in the fall of 1986, just two years after graduating from that same institution. Bill's initial overture to the law school had been, shall we say, inauspicious: His student application was rejected. Undeterred, he and his wife Ruth moved to Charlottesville anyway, and Stuntz worked for a year as a night clerk at a local inn. Having established state residency, Stuntz reapplied and was admitted. Three years later, he graduated first in his class with numerous prizes, and went on to prestigious clerkships, first in Philadelphia with U.S. District Court Judge Louis Pollak, former dean of the Yale and University of Pennsylvania law schools, and then with Supreme Court Justice Lewis
Powell.
When Bill returned to Virginia as an assistant professor in 1986, his new colleagues wondered what subject he would choose as his specialty. Robert Scott-one of Stuntz's law school mentors and later his dean-lobbied hard for Bill to follow his footsteps into commercial law, a field with a distinguished history that was entering a particularly vibrant phrase owing to the advent of the law-and-economics movement. Had he chosen this path, there is no doubt that Criminal procedure scholars had helped lead and shape that revolution.
But public backlash against rising crime rates and President Nixon's reconstitution of the Supreme Court had brought the criminal procedure revolution to a crashing halt around 1970.
Over the next two decades, scholarship in the field languished as law reviews published endless liberal lamentations over the latest Burger Court retrenchment. The time seemed unpropitious for a talented young scholar to launch a career in this field. Ron Allen, later Bill's co-author on a leading criminal procedure casebook, remembers telling Stuntz that becoming a criminal procedure scholar was sure to "kill brain cells."
Nobody would make such a claim about criminal procedure-or, more generally, criminal justice-scholarship today. The field has been dramatically reinvigorated and transformed-in large part owing to the work, and the influence, of William J. Stuntz. ***** Stuntz made his scholarly debut with Self-Incrimination and Excuse, an article that explored the poor fit between Fifth Amendment case law and privacy and autonomy-the values that were said to animate self-incrimination doctrine. For example, the Supreme Court had held that, despite the impairment of privacy and autonomy, law enforcement officials were permitted to require criminal defendants to provide blood samples and to identify themselves at the scene of an accident. Stuntz offered a novel alternative account of the privilege against selfincrimination by analogizing it to criminal law's doctrine of excuse: Just as the criminal justice system partially excuses defendants for behavior committed under duress-not because that behavior is right but because it is understandable-so does it recognize that defendants put to the choice of lying, being jailed for contempt for refusing to testify, or incriminating themselves by telling the truth are unlikely to play the part of heroes. Stuntz argued that this excuse-based understanding of the privilege made sense of many otherwise inexplicable aspects of the doctrine like waiver, use immunity, and required production of documents.
In his second major article, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 2 Stuntz examined the seeming tension between the broad array of robust rights protected by the Supreme Court under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and the apparent ease with which the Court permitted those rights to be waived through defendants' ignorance and even police deception. Stuntz rejected the conventional explanation that the Warren Court's successors were simply undermining rights of which they disapproved through lenient waiver rules. Instead, he sought to reconcile the tension by noting that criminal procedure rights often protect the interests of people other than the rights holder. For example, Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are designed to safeguard the rights of innocent people, but when the protections are enforced by the exclusion of relevant evidence, criminals are rewarded.
Stuntz argued that waiver doctrine reduced these windfall benefits by permitting waivers of rights when third-party beneficiaries could be independently protected.
In another early article, Stuntz dissected the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. in effect encouraged them to raise procedural issues, which could be pursued cheaply, rather than issues of guilt or innocence, which involved costly investigation and trials. The result was a decline in resources available for defendants who were factually innocent and an exacerbation of class disparities between affluent defendants who could afford to hire lawyers and poor defendants stuck with underfinanced public defenders. Finally, overcriminalization enhanced the risk of racial discrimination by expanding prosecutorial discretion
Bill's growing concerns about race and class discrimination are evident in other work from this period. In 1998, Bill explained how the disparate punishments meted out to largely white cocaine users and largely black crack users were likely caused by systemic factors rather than individual racist acts. 8 Street sales of crack in poor urban neighborhoods are cheaper to investigate than are private sales of powder cocaine in upscale suburban neighborhoods. In addition, urban drug crime has more devastating effects on local communities, partly because it is more likely to be violent and partly because these communities often are already teetering near the edge of collapse. Thus, it is rational for police and prosecutors pursuing drug trafficking to target open air drug markets in poor, predominantly minority neighborhoods (much as they targeted prostitution and alcohol in an earlier era). Still, Stuntz worried that a system widely perceived to be racially biased could not maintain legitimacy in the minds of those who disproportionately bore its costs. Stuntz therefore argued for reducing the sentencing disparity between the use of crack and powder cocaine, using investigative techniques that targeted the collateral effects of drug markets rather than the buyers and sellers themselves, and allocating more law enforcement resources to upscale drug markets.
In 1999 The result of this web of institutional incentives is a "pathological" system of bloated criminal liability and vast prosecutorial discretion. Judges, whose institutional and cultural incentives might incline them more to safeguard the interests of criminal defendants, have few effective tools with which to counteract legislative overcriminalization, and they are increasingly excluded from the criminal adjudication process by plea bargains and legislative constraints on sentencing. These trends, in turn, lead to sporadic enforcement of criminal law, which undermines its credibility. Instead of trials designed to separate the innocent from the guilty, the system is dominated by plea bargaining, which sweeps up the innocent and guilty alike. This system is also too predisposed to criminalize widely practiced but officially condemned vice, because police and prosecutors can target enforcement towards a small, politically powerless segment of the offending population. The best strategy for fixing this system, Stuntz argued, was to empower judges to place constitutional limits on legislative overcriminalization, through some combination of fair-notice requirements, desuetude constraints, and restoration of judicial discretion over sentencing.
In a related article, published a few years later, Stuntz analogized the criminal justice system to a funnel. 13 At the broad end are the many citizens who find themselves in contact with the police. As the funnel narrows, one finds the smaller number of suspects who get charged, and then finally, the even smaller number who go to prison. Stuntz argued that the Supreme Bill posted blog entries both as therapy for himself and "as a window into the world" of suffering for others; it was an "ugly world" but one that was home to so many people. 34 He noted how living with chronic pain and illness was like living "life in the closet"-"a secret world, a world my friends and loved ones cannot know-and, I pray, one they never will know." 35 Secrets seem shameful; sufferers worry that some failing of theirs, some character flaw, had left them to "inhabit this strange and terrible unseen place." 36 Bill hoped to open the closet door so that others could see inside.
Bill thought it possible to draw meaning from a life characterized by "weariness and pain
[that] are everywhere." 37 He did not deny the ugliness of the pain that clung to him "like a stain that cannot be cleansed," but he rejoiced in the fact that God was not repulsed by the ugliness but instead "wrapped His arms around it" and sought to cleanse it. 38 Bill found humor in his drug treatment-for example, from a drug labeled "5-FU." 39 He came to appreciate the beauty of living in the moment, when one no longer assumes one will be around for the college graduation of one's children or the birth of one's grandchildren. Experiencing the beauty of the Charles River from his hospital bed brought a smile to his face. Though cancer and its treatment "are nasty businesses"-he would not pretend otherwise-he also found in them "benefits unimagined," especially the love and kindness of his friends and family. 40 Though cancer was "a supremely ugly disease," he found its treatment sometimes "a kind of beauty," as when he watched nurses and doctors in the cancer unit treat a teenage victim with kindness and compassion. is certain to receive. We think that it is one of the best books ever written about the law.
In the book, Stuntz traces the history of the American criminal justice system in search of explanations for our current conundrum-a massive incarceration rate, strongly correlated with race. We have reached a place, he claimed, where our system more closely resembles that of the Soviet gulag than of the rest of the western world with which America is ordinarily compared.
How could this have happened?
For Stuntz, our current morass called to mind Jefferson's famous metaphor for the dilemma faced by antebellum slave holders, who held the "wolf by the ears": How could they emancipate millions of blacks from slavery without igniting deadly violence against their former masters? Modern day Americans, Stuntz believed, saw themselves facing a similar quandary: how could they end mass incarceration without liberating hundreds of thousands of prisoners whose return to the streets would likely restore the horrific crime rates of the 1970s and 1980s?
Stuntz argued that much as southern slave owners misconceived the consequences of emancipation, so too, many Americans today misunderstand the relationship between mass incarceration and crime rates.
The book centers on Stuntz's observations regarding the peculiar relationship between crime rates and incarceration rates over the last 50 years. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United
States experienced enormous increases in the rate of violent crime-in some cities, murder rates increased more than ten-fold-while incarceration rates in some states simultaneously declined by as much as 30 to 40 percent. Over the following few decades, incarceration rates increased exponentially-in some states, by as much as seven or eight fold-while crime rates first continued to rise and then began to fall, albeit very slowly. American prisons and jails that housed fewer than 200,000 inmates during the early years of Nixon's presidency held more than 1.5 million at the beginning of Obama's. Seventy percent of black American males who failed to graduate from high school will be incarcerated during their lifetimes. Such mass incarceration not only decimates minority communities but also undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system in the minds of those who are so disproportionately victimized by it.
Stuntz blamed much of this predicament on the Warren Court's ill-timed criminal procedure revolution. By erecting procedural impediments to the punishment of violent crime in the midst of growing public panic about a crime epidemic, the Court ensured a political backlash, which nationalized the crime issue, launched a tsunami of retributivism in criminal punishment, and inspired legislatures to respond in ways that produced assembly-line justice, which poorly sorts the innocent from the guilty.
Always the hopeful reformer, Stuntz offered recommendations for escaping our current predicament. First, he urged a return to the sort of localized, relatively nonpunitive criminal justice system that characterized northern cities in the late nineteenth century. This was a system in which the same ethnic minorities that constituted the bulk of the criminal population also made the relevant decisions-in local politics, as local police officers and prosecutors, and as jurors-that determined how many of their ethnic compatriots to incarcerate. Today, by contrast, many of the decisions that send young black and Latino men to jail in extraordinary numbers are made by government officials relatively unaccountable to local politics-national and state legislators, unelected federal prosecutors, and state's attorneys elected at the county level (which often mix more powerful white suburbs with disempowered minority urban cores). Stuntz also advocated returning to a regime in which judges have discretion to interpret criminal statutes to do justice and in which juries, rendered largely irrelevant by plea bargaining, can use their power to nullify unfair prosecutions. The constitutional law of criminal justice, Stuntz urged, should focus less on procedural protections that benefit mostly the guilty and more on substantive constraints that curb overcriminalization, curtail racially disparate punishments, and require that criminal statutes be enforced consistently or not at all. Invoking social science studies that show that more policing is a better way to fight crime than more incarceration, Stuntz applauded experiments in community policing, which can effectively deter crime, while enhancing the legitimacy of law enforcement in the neighborhoods that it targets. While there is no simple solution to these incentives to overcriminalize, Richman calls for an increased focus on noncriminal institutions and sanctions as tools of regulation.
In "Stealing Bill Stuntz," David Sklansky, yet another colleague of Bill's from Supreme Court clerkship days, 42 imagines Stuntz as our new Charles Dickens. Just as all political camps sought to claim Dickens as an ally, so, too, has Stuntz been embraced by everyone from Burkean conservatives to radical critical race theorists. Sklansky attributes Stuntz's broad appeal to three themes that pervade his scholarship. First, criminal justice is a complex system with interrelated parts. This theme reveals Stuntz's scholarly commitment to understanding the real world in all its complexity, and it induced a certain humility in his scholarship, though not a fatalistic paralysis. Second, the criminal justice system has its own distinctive political economy. This theme relates to Stuntz's pragmatism and puts him at odds with other theoretical approaches, such as originalism and expressivism, which are less focused upon devising rules that promote social welfare. Third, Stuntz's scholarship evinces concern with improving the lot of the least advantaged participants in the system, especially racial minorities. This commitment led Stuntz 
Part II: Police Investigation
The essays in Part II focus on issues arising from police investigation. In "What the Police Do," Anne Coughlin, Bill's co-clerk in Justice Powell's chambers in 1985-86, analogizes police interrogation to seduction and rape, thereby combining insights drawn from both criminal law and criminal procedure in good Stuntzian fashion. The law of both rape and confession emphasize the importance of distinguishing consent from coercion; both tolerate fraud but not violence; both involve activity usually conducted in private; both are usually zero-sum games;
and both often involve strangers using power against their victims. Coughlin provocatively asks why the law of criminal interrogation treats men, who dominate the pool of criminal suspects, as if they were women, who dominate the pool of rape victims.
In "The Distribution of Dignity and the Fourth Amendment," Tracey Meares explores constitutional regulation of police searches and seizures. Meares's earlier work in this area, which drew upon Stuntzian concerns regarding distributional justice, argued that courts should evaluate search-and-seizure tactics based on whether the community adopting them had internalized the relevant costs. In this chapter, Meares emphasizes "evenhandness" and investigates how that concept relates to the Fourth Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion. In her view, randomized procedures conducted without reasonable suspicion, such as sobriety checkpoints, are praiseworthy, both because they avoid racial profiling and because they encourage encounters that respect the dignity of those who are targeted.
In "Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause," Orin Kerr rejects the notion that courts should attempt to quantify the meaning of the Fourth Amendment's "probable cause"
requirement. Kerr observes that affidavits filed by police officers in support of search warrants generally fail to inform the magistrate about investigative techniques that have been tried but failed to produce incriminating evidence and about those that were not tried at all. Kerr worries that quantitative standards, because they implicate powerful cognitive biases, would divert judges from attending to this omitted information and thus generate less accurate results than standards that simply encourage judges to rely on their intuitive "situation sense."
In The essays in the book's final part focus upon two related concepts that are sometimes thought to be in tension with the rule of law -emotion and discretion. Bill thought that both were important, and his later work, especially on the distributional consequences of our criminal justice system, spelled out why.
In he shed light on current conundrums through the use of history; he illuminated the unintended and often deleterious consequences of the Warren Court's revolution in criminal procedure; and he proposed possible escape routes from our current predicament of mass incarceration, which destroys lives, devastates minority urban communities, and delegitimizes the legal system that produces it.
But Bill Stuntz did not merely enlighten us with his brilliant scholarship. He was also our colleague, our friend, our trusted advisor, and our inspiration.
Bill was a fabulous classroom law teacher. From his first days at Virginia, students adored him. He was a master of the material; he was comfortable at the podium; he was brilliant; he was funny; he was excited by and appreciative of student contributions; and he engaged and stretched their minds. Bill was also extraordinarily accessible to students: He never set office hours because he was always in the office and was happy to talk with students whenever they dropped by, and for as long as they wished.
Bill was also the best colleague and friend we could imagine having. He was curious, knowledgeable, generous with his time, fun to talk to, and the consummate team player. He read our scholarship with a meticulous eye, and his comments were always invaluable: detailed, incisive, constructive, encouraging. He performed this service not only for us, but for an entire generation of criminal procedure (and other) scholars across the country. Stuntz was the Bill Russell of legal academia: He helped make all of his teammates-as well as his "competitors"-the best that they could be. Last but not least, Bill taught us the important lesson-especially vital to recall in today's fiercely polarized political culture-that people who do not see eye to eye politically can still respect, admire, and cherish one another. We sometimes-two of us, often--disagreed with Bill about which candidate to support for public office, but political disagreement never got in the way of a deeper sense of connection. Nobody who knew him could ever question Bill's integrity, his good will, and his compassion for the least advantaged in our society. Through his example, he taught us that political disagreements are often about means rather than ends, and that more is to be gained by empathizing with and understanding our political opponents than by demonizing them.
Bill's legacy will live on for decades through his scholarship and in the hearts and minds of thousands of students and scores of colleagues. We believe that he was one of the greatest law professors of his generation, as well as one of the most beloved. It is our privilege and our pleasure to present this volume of essays, testifying to his influence and dedicated to his memory.
